This paper presents the preliminary results and analysis of a comprehensive survey of the. implementation of accelerator safety interlock systems from over 30 international labs. At the present time there is not a self consistent means to evaluate both the experiences and level of protection provided by electronic safety interlock systems.
INTRODUCTION
To date, there are no basic requirements or generally accepted standards for the design of safety interlock systems in accelerators. Some specialized industries, such as medical accelerators have general guidance for interlocks for oncology machines, and more guidelines are under development (refl,2). Some standards which could be applied to safety interlock system design (ref.3) are under development but there are no guidelines or requirements for the application of these standards for accelerators.
The purpose behind a survey of accelerator safety system implementations was to provide some foundation for comparing "good practice" within the industry. To this end several different types of accelerators were chosen in order to have a comprehensive picture of the practices involved. Specific goals were to:
Gather a wide variety of data on safety system applications within the accelerator community. Get an idea of the implemenlation methods used by safety system designers in diverse applications. Compare methods used in the design of accelerator safety interlock systems to those in other high risk industries. Compare attributes such as complexity, cost, reliability, and customer satisfaction between different machines. Form a basis of "Good Praclice" which may then be used to develop standards and guidance applicable to accelerator safety systems.
The intended audience for the survey were the persons directly involved in the design, maintenance, and supervision of safety interlock systems. The focus of the survey was on those systems used to interlock prompt ionizing radiation hazards.
SURVEY DESIGN
The survey was broken up into 100 questions, divided There are a few basic attributes which can be compared among safety interlock system implementations: Technology Redundancy Layering (multiplicity of devices) Diversity of components Each of these attributes may or may not add to the safety or availability of a system. Some are a matter of practice.
Typically, in fields which are highly competitive or under great scrutiny, the implementations are optimized for performance -both availability and safety. Examples of such applications may be a the airline industry or nuclear power stations. For both to be economically viable, the safety system must be extremely reliable and also free of false trips. In applications which are less competitive, 0-7803-4376-X/98/$10.000 1998 IEEl? such as research physics accelerators, safety systems vary greatly in the implementation. Availability has historically not been a driving consideration in these designs.
TECHNOLOGY
A basic theme of one section of the survey was to determine what type of technology was used in the design of the system. Until recently, almost all safety interlock systems were designed using relay based systems. In contrast, the newer designs are using the advantages of programmable electronic based designs. In particular, programmable logic controller (PLC) based designs are becoming prevalent in the nuclear physics accelerators, while microprocessor based systems are used in industrial and medical applications. A pivot of 1990 was used to look at the breakdown of electronic vs. electromechanical (relay) based systems. A majority of the electronic systems implemented after 1990 were electronic or programmable systems. Most of the relay based systems implemented after 1990 were extensions or upgrades to existing systems.
The trend is to replace relay based systems with electronic systems when the cost and increased availability can be justified.
ARCHITECTURE
The most common architecture for accelerator safety interlock systems is the dual redundant arrangement. There are varying degrees of isolation between the two chains, however, there are typically two independent systems. Most of the safety systems use layering of devices which are interfaced to, or controlled by the safety system. Layering of protection devices is used to achieve a diversity between protection devices so that the system is less susceptible to common cause failure modes. An example of layering vs. redundancy is shown in figure 1. 
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DESIGN BASIS
The technology involved in the implementation of safety systems was relatively well understood. One of the survey questions asked "Was there a design goal for safety system reliability?' There were three basic types of responses. The most prominent were the qualitative response of "no failures," with 86% of those responding. The next two most common answers were quantitative with 14 % giving a number of failures per year and 4 % giving a number of 0.5 -1 failure per year. The disparity between the requirements again points to a lack of a common definition of safety reliability within the accelerator community.
CUSTOMER SATISFACTION
Two of the questions had to do with the satisfaction with the safety system. 100% of the respondents were satisfied with their safety system. The validity of this response comes into question when compared with some quantitative measure of satisfaction. For example, 20% of the respondents thought that their system was difficult to operate or to trouble shoot. Thirty-five percent had not done any type of reliability analysis of their system or the potential failure mechanisms. What was most surprising was that, while the majority of respondents set a criteria of "no failures" and were "completely satisfied" with their system, 26% have actually uncovered unsafe failures in their system. Table 5 compares the approach taken by several different industries which use safety interlock systems for life safety. An important distinction between the applications is not necessarily the quantitative risk associated with the hazard, but rather the perception of the risk in the general public's eye.
COMPARING TO OTHER INDUSTRIES
Note that the increased redundancy of the aircraft, nuclear power, and chemical applications is not necessarily to achieve an increase in the reliability of the safety system, but rather to achieve an increase in the availability of the system. A typical 3x redundant system would use a voting arrangement such that if one of the systems failed, the other two would still maintain the safety interlocks.
ADMINISTRATION
Administration of safety systems is an important factor when and if one considers incorporation of the system into a total quality management (TQM) frame work. It is a must if one considers working to the I S 0 9000 series of standards. Only 6% of the respondents were IS0 9000 certified. Another 17% were either considering IS0 certification or actively working toward IS0 standards.
Other questions in the administrative section dealt with issues such as satisfaction with current funding (79%), and management support (95%). 
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